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INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Common Core State Standards (Standards) 
has been called “one of the swiftest and most remarkable shifts in 
education policy in U.S. history.”1 First proposed in 2008, the 
Standards were quickly promoted by wealthy philanthropists like 
Bill Gates and the Federal Department of Education as part of its 
Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative.2 Through a combination of 
private grants, federal grants, and conditional waivers to states of 
requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), an 
astonishing forty-five states had adopted and begun implementing 
the Standards by 2010.3
The process by which the Standards were adopted raises 
compelling public law questions concerning administrative law, 
federalism, nonprofit law, and education policymaking. Several 
scholars have examined the implications of the Department of 
Education’s use of waivers of NCLB requirements along with federal 
grantmaking under the RTTT initiative to incentivize state adoption 
of the Standards.4 Some have hailed the Standards approach as a 
triumph of innovative and efficient cooperative federalism through 
which the Department of Education bypassed partisan legislative 
gridlock to encourage states to improve educational standards, 
achievement, and equity across the country.5 Others describe the 
Standards initiative as an example of federal overreach into 
                                                     
1. Lyndsey Layton, How Bill Gates Pulled off the Swift Common Core 





4. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education 
Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 959, 988-92 (2015); Derek W. Black, 
Federalizing Education By Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607, 663-64 (2015). 
5. See, e.g., Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New 
Education Federalism, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 594-95 (2015). 
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educational policymaking, which is considered the province of states 
and localities.6 Some of these observers call for restrictions on the 
federal role in education, either based on Tenth Amendment 
limitations on state coercion through federal spending or based on 
the limit to the Education Department’s waiver authority, which they 
agree has exceeded the scope of legislative delegation.7
A crucially important, yet less explored, concern about the 
education reform agenda (as related to Common Core and beyond) is 
private philanthropy’s role in impacting public policymaking. The 
speed with which the Standards were conceived and adopted is due 
in significant part to the influx of private dollars to support 
development of the Standards. Private money also allowed 
proponents of the Standards to press the federal government, a 
majority of states, and a variety of education stakeholders to adopt 
and implement the Standards in record time.8  
Indeed, wealthy individuals and foundations, through what 
some have dubbed “philanthrocapitalism,”9 have played a significant 
role in setting the current education reform agenda.10 They have done 
this in a number of areas including support for charter schools, small 
school establishment, removal of teacher job protections in the name 
of accountability, and other recent education policy initiatives that 
have gained traction.11 The role of philanthrocapitalists in the 
Common Core process is a striking example of the degree to which a 
small number of wealthy individuals can play a prominent role in 
education policymaking. Their role in this endeavor and in other 
educational initiatives is of particular concern given (1) the 
impending presidential election; (2) growing concerns about the 
impact of income and wealth inequality both on educational 
opportunity and on ordinary people’s ability to engage with and 
influence important public policy development; (3) the mixed record 
of the recent slew of reforms to foster meaningful positive change in 
                                                     
6. See, e.g., Robert S. Eitel & Kent D. Talbert, The Road to a National 
Curriculum: The Legal Aspects of the Common Core Standards, Race to the Top, and 
Conditional Waivers, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 17, 24-25 (2012). 
7. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After 
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1935-36 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 1. 
9. See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 755 (2011). 
10. See, e.g., Noelle Quam, Note, Big Philanthropy’s Unrestrained 
Influence on Public Education: A Call for Change, 21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC.
JUST. 601, 614-15 (2015). 
11. Id. at 616-17. 
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public education; and (4) concern about ulterior motives behind the 
reforms. 
This Article examines the phenomenon of philanthrocapitalism 
in current education reform, with a focus on the Standards initiative. 
Part I describes the role that a small group of philanthropists played 
in setting and catalyzing the Standards development and 
implementation. This description includes private philanthropists’ 
interactions with federal, state, and local government actors and 
other stakeholders. It also examines their work in the political 
process and the public discourse. Part II then considers the Common 
Core initiative over the last five years, including the role of 
philanthrocapitalists, nonprofits, and the state and federal 
governments, and the recent public backlash against and 
reconsiderations of the Standards. Part III considers the proper scope 
and limits of private philanthropists’ role in public education 
policymaking from the perspective of public law norms, governance, 
and policymaking. Drawing upon structural governance models 
designed to support robust public engagement in education 
policymaking, as well as those designed to prevent agency capture, 
the Article closes by considering methods for placing appropriate 
boundaries on the influence of philanthrocapitalists. At the same 
time, it acknowledges the difficulty of imposing meaningful limits in 
a political environment dominated by the influence of private wealth. 
I. PHILANTHROCAPITALISM AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. EDUCATION 
REFORM AND COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
A. Philanthrocapitalism 
Against a backdrop of stark and growing income and wealth 
inequality in the United States,12 a new13 form of philanthropy has 
                                                     
12. According to a recent report: 
[T]he share of wealth owned by the top 1% families has regularly grown 
since the late 1970s and reaches 42% in 2012. Most of this increase is 
driven by the top 0.1%, whose wealth share has grown from 7% of in 1978 
to 22% in 2012, a level comparable to that of the early 20th century. 
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, Q.J. ECON., Feb. 16, 2016, at 1 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/pep/pep26.pdf [https://perma.cc/72JE-M2CD]. At the 
same time, the share of income and wealth of the bottom 90% of U.S. families has 
declined:  
[I]n a sharp reversal of past trends, the bottom 90% wealth share has fallen 
since [the mid 1980’s], to about 23% in 2012. . . . The key driver of the 
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emerged that has significant implications for public law and policy. 
Dubbed philanthrocapitalism (and sometimes “venture 
philanthropy”), this model of philanthropic giving has as its aim the 
explicit application of business principles to philanthropy and the 
leveraging of private dollars to effect significant public policy 
change.14 Philanthrocapitalism, according to its proponents, promotes 
social good through targeted giving, while also benefiting the private 
sector contributors. The term “philanthrocapitalism” is said to have 
been first coined in a 2006 Economist magazine article15 and more 
fully developed in a book by Matthew Bishop and Michael Green.16
Philanthrocapitalism conceives of financial giving as 
investment in the work of social entrepreneurs that will have 
significant impact on the particular issue or problem to be addressed. 
This impact is often viewed through the lens of a market 
infrastructure that imposes market models of competition,
quantification, and profit-taking stemming from successful private 
business models. Philanthrocapitalism also seeks to maximize the 
social return on the philanthropic investment, both in terms of the 
stated goals and in terms of benefit to the social investors. One of the 
                                                                                                               
declining bottom 90% share is the plummeting of middle-class saving, a 
fall which itself may partly owe to the low growth of middle-class income, 
to financial deregulation leading to some forms of predatory lending, or to 
growing behavioral biases in the saving decisions of [the] middle-class. 
Id. at 3. 
13. Some say that this form of philanthropy is not new. See, e.g., LINSEY 
MCGOEY, NO SUCH THING AS A FREE GIFT: THE GATES FOUNDATION AND THE PRICE 
OF PHILANTHROPY 40 (2015) (“Organized philanthropy is not at all new or unique to 
America.”).
14. Critiques of philanthrocapitalism in the public education context relate 
it to broader efforts to privatize public schooling:  
The new philanthropy is at the forefront of a right-wing movement to 
corporatize education at multiple levels. That is, venture philanthropy 
(VP) contributes to both the privatization of public schooling as well as 
the transformation of public schooling that is based on the model of 
corporate culture—from voucher schemes to charter schools to the 
remaking of teacher education, educational leadership, and classrooms. 
Educational philanthropy that appears almost exclusively in mass media 
and policy circles as selfless generosity poses significant threats to the 
democratic possibilities and realities of public education. 
KENNETH J. SALTMAN, THE GIFT OF EDUCATION: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND VENTURE 
PHILANTHROPY 1 (2010). 
15. The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism, ECONOMIST (Feb. 23, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/5517656 [https://perma.cc/YPM9-X6C4]. 
16. MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW 
THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD 5 (2008). 
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most notable characteristics of philanthrocapitalism is its emphasis 
on using philanthropic contributions as investments to leverage other 
money—often public dollars—to maximize the impact of its social 
investments and related policy choices.17 Some have called 
philanthrocapitalists “hyperagents of change” because the design of 
their targeted philanthropy extends beyond large monetary 
contributions by combining with nonprofit and government partners 
to effect larger scale change.18 Indeed, certain proponents of 
philanthrocapitalists explicitly state that one of the most effective 
ways to leverage their money is “to use it to shape how political 
power is exercised.”19
Responses to this new philanthropy vary. Some applaud the 
model’s combination of significant monetary contribution with a 
focus on metrics, outcomes, and multipliers.20 Proponents see 
philanthrocapitalism as capable of solving problems government is 
ill-equipped to handle. Proponents generally accept the notion that 
philanthropists can “do well by doing good” with little concern about 
downside implications for public structures or public policymaking. 
Critics of the new philanthrocapitalism question why market-
based approaches are viewed as more effective than public problem-
solving,21 particularly in the face of massive market failure 
exemplified by the Great Recession and the growth of wealth 
inequality in the United States and globally. They raise the concern 
that many initiatives, though nominally focused on issues related to 
poverty, actually may serve to undermine broader public efforts to 
reduce poverty and inequality.22 More broadly, some critics note that 
given the degree to which the world’s wealthiest people have 
benefited from the financial crisis, the focus of their charitable giving 
not only fails to reduce income and wealth inequality, but appears to 
                                                     
17. See MCGOEY, supra note 13, at 15-16. McGoey notes that while the 
application of business techniques to philanthropy is not new, both the scale and 
explicitness of market-based approaches to philanthropy are new developments. Id. 
18. David Rieff, Philanthrocapitalism: A Self-Love Story, NATION (Oct. 1, 
2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/philanthrocapitalism-a-self-love-story/ 
[https://perma.cc/D87E-F9HM]. 
19. BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 16, at 240. 
20. Id. at 6-7.
21. See Michael Edwards, “Philanthrocapitalism” and Its Limits, 10 INT’L
J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 22, 24-25 (2008). 
22. See, e.g., Devi Sridhar & Rajaie Batniji, Misfinancing Global Health: A 
Case for Transparency in Disbursements and Decision Making, 372 LANCET 1185, 
1185 (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-
6736%2808%2961485-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2MV-HG9Z].  
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have had the opposite effect.23 This raises a concern about 
philanthropy having a role in making the rich richer and the poor 
poorer.24 Concerns also arise with respect to expertise,25 public 
engagement, and the impact of philanthrocapitalism on public 
policymaking and priority setting.26 This concern includes policy 
priorities in areas like health and education, as well as broader 
structural public policy involving taxation and regulation designed to 
protect the interests of the broader public. As Linsey McGoey notes: 
Another concern is that philanthropy is used to thwart demands for higher 
taxation, protecting and expanding assets rather than redistributing wealth. 
Philanthropy often opens up markets for US or European-based 
multinationals which partner with organizations such as the Gates 
Foundation in order to reach new consumers. Giving more is an avenue 
for getting more, helping to concentrate wealth in an ever-narrowing 
nucleus of power-brokers with growing influence over policy-setting 
. . . .27
Critics also raise concerns about the lack of accountability and 
transparency of philanthrocapitalists in public policymaking and the 
erosion of support for government spending on health and education 
when large private sums of money are channeled toward public 
services.28
Some critics, like Robin Rogers, also note the need to 
differentiate philanthrocapitalism from philanthro-policymaking.29
The former is focused on applying business principles to 
philanthropy, along with the notion of “doing well while doing 
good.” The latter involves the use of philanthropic investments to 
drive public policymaking and direct public funds.30 As Noelle Quam 
notes: 
Big Philanthropy is open about its commitment to implementing its own 
theories of educational change. For example, the Walton Family 
Foundation—one of the largest philanthropic foundations involved in 
education reform—has specified particular initiatives funded by the 158 
                                                     
23. MCGOEY, supra note 13, at 18.  
24. Id.
25. See Peter Lorenzi & Francis G. Hilton, Optimizing 
Philanthrocapitalism, 48 SOC’Y 397, 399 (2011), http://link.springer.com/article/ 
10.1007/s12115-011-9468-x# [https://perma.cc/E259-DFFH]. 
26. See Robin Rogers, Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters, 48 SOC’Y
376, 376-78 (2011), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12115-011-9456-
1#page-1 [https://perma.cc/5S5W-GD3K].  
27. MCGOEY, supra note 13, at 19. 
28. See id. at 8. 
29. See Rogers, supra note 26, at 376-77.
30. See id.  
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million dollars the foundation spent on education reform in 2012. These 
initiatives included investments in charter schools, teacher effectiveness, 
and replacement of low-performing schools. The Gates Foundation—
perhaps the largest philanthropic contributor to education reform—states 
that its focus is primarily on teacher effectiveness, implementation of the 
Common Core, and technological innovation in the classroom.31
The Gates, Broad, and Walton foundations have contributed 
significantly to public education reform in the United States.32
However, the largest impact on public education reform has 
occurred with significant funding from Gates. Public education 
reform efforts funded by the Gates Foundation include small schools, 
charter schools, mayoral control of large urban school systems, high-
stakes standardized testing tied to teacher evaluation, and most 
recently, imposition of the Common Core State Standards. 
Regarding the Standards, Bill Gates has been fairly candid about his 
views: “‘This is like having a common electrical system,’ Gates told 
the Wall Street Journal in 2011. ‘It just makes sense to me.’”33 Many 
global corporate leaders share this view and express concern about 
the preparedness of U.S. workers in an increasingly globalized 
economy.34 This view is consistent with a reform model that 
emphasizes metrics, competition, quantification, and standardization. 
Indeed a frequent critique of the Standards approach is that it 
conflates standards and standardization.35
In addition, the emphasis on “data driven” approaches has 
raised concerns about Mr. Gates’s motives given that his corporation 
Microsoft is one of the largest computer hardware and software 
makers in the world. Similar concerns have been raised about the 
broader corporate business interest in market-based education 
reform. Gates’s reform approach draws on longer-term efforts to 
apply market models, accountability, and standardization to public 
education as part of a larger privatization effort that many trace back 
to the late 1980s.36 The privatization effort was fostered by the 
                                                     
31. Noelle Quam, Big Philanthropy’s Unrestrained Influence on Public 
Education: A Call for Change, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 601, 616-
17 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
32. See SALTMAN, supra note 14, at 1. 
33. Peter Elkind, Business Gets Schooled, FORTUNE MAG., Jan. 1, 2016, at 
48, 53. 
34. Id. at 52 (“To CEOs, the issue has always been a no-brainer. In an 
increasingly global economy, what sense does it make for America to have 50 
different sets of education standards?”).
35. Eitel & Talbert, supra note 6, at 24-25. 
36. Elkind, supra note 33, at 52. 
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report, A Nation at Risk, which sent an alarm about the mediocre and 
declining quality of the U.S. public education system.37 It sparked the 
mantra of “failing public schools” that has yielded everything from 
voucher proposals, to accountability provisions in the NCLB, to the 
current push for a range of metrics-driven, market-based public 
education reforms. This Article focuses on the Standards because 
this kind of private–public rapid and broad impact policy 
development seems to create the greatest challenges in terms of the 
impact of private forces, including philanthropy, on shaping public 
policy and redefining public processes. 
Several critics raise the concern that absent some limitations, 
public education policymaking will have been ceded to a small group 
of wealthy billionaires who will (1) squander money and good 
intentions on education reforms that lack empirical support or 
genuine connection to community needs; (2) create chaos in public 
education by constantly changing reform priorities to the overall 
detriment of public education; or (3) use philanthropy to set policies 
that benefit their for-profit bottom lines by giving their related 
private companies and partners favored access to public education 
markets in technology, curriculum, charter management, etc.38
The most vociferous critics of market-based public education 
reform efforts emphasize that the reforms are all related in seeking to 
privatize public education, as Kenneth Saltman asserts:  
These corporate school reforms are deeply interwoven with commercial 
interests in the multi-billion-dollar test and textbook publishing industries, 
the information technology and database tracking industries, and the 
contracting industries. The corporate sector has in the last decade 
positioned education in the United States as a roughly $800-billion-per-
year ‘industry’, ripe for takeover.39
Supporters of the reforms counter that the reforms are designed to 
improve student achievement and educational rigor.40 Many further 
                                                     
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Joanne Barkan, Got Dough? How Billionaires Rule Our 
Schools, DISSENT MAG. (2011), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/got-dough-
how-billionaires-rule-our-schools [https://perma.cc/N4XU-4TLF]. 
39. Kenneth J. Saltman, Why Henry Giroux’s Democratic Pedagogy Is 
Crucial for Confronting Failed Corporate School Reform and How Liberals Like 
Ravitch and Darling-Hammond Are Making Things Worse, 10 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 
674, 675 (2012), www.wwwords.co.uk/PFIE [https://perma.cc/KA3Y-A9YP]. 
40. See, e.g., Bill Gates, Bill Gates on Innovation in Education Reform,
FORBES (2014), http://www.forbes.com/video/3117956152001/ [https://perma.cc/TZ87-
V88R]; About the Standards, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, 
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argue that the reforms support civil rights goals of providing choices 
and excellent education to students traditionally disserved by failing 
public schools.41
B. Genesis and Development of the Common Core State Standards 
and the Role of Philanthrocapitalists, States, and the Federal 
Government 
The development and implementation of the Standards are part 
of a longstanding effort to improve and provide consistency for 
public school curricular standards in states across the country.42 The 
Standards effort is also characterized as part of a broader project of 
privatizing and applying market models to public education.43 This 
project has been propelled by a narrative emphasizing the failure of 
public schools focused on student achievement gaps. Some attribute 
achievement gaps to the impact of poverty, inequality, and 
disinvestment in public schools.44 Others attribute public school 
                                                                                                               
http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/ [https://perma.cc/3XJ9-ZVZ7] 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
41. See, e.g., Eitel & Talbert, supra note 6, at 20; see also John Legend, 
Education Reform: The Civil Rights Issue of Our Time, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-legend/education-reform-the-
civi_b_426490.html [https://perma.cc/XG5Z-FUP8]. But see Diane Ravitch, Public 
Education: Who Are the Corporate Reformers?, MOYERS & CO. (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://billmoyers.com/2014/03/28/public-education-who-are-the-corporate-reformers/ 
[https://perma.cc/L73A-Q5J5]. 
42. Development Process, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/development-process/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CWR-LQ88] (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).  
43. See, e.g., ANTHONY CODY, THE EDUCATOR AND THE OLIGARCH 168 
(2014). Cody observes: “In Gates’ view, the way to meet the needs of the poor is to 
make it profitable for corporations to do so. The simple fact that a drive for profits is 
far more often the source of poverty than a solution to it has escaped him.” Id. at 
169; MERCEDES K. SCHNEIDER, A CHRONICLE OF ECHOES 202-03 (2014). 
44. See, e.g., Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, 
Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 17
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/unfinished-march-public-school-
segregation/ [https://perma.cc/M6H3-2JA7] (“For low-income African American 
children, continued improvement will most likely be accomplished by addressing 
the socioeconomic barriers the Coleman Report identified a half century ago; by 
providing high-quality early childhood care, staffed by well-educated professionals 
who can expose children to sophisticated intellectual environments like the ones 
typical middle-class children enjoy; and by providing high-quality after-school and 
summer programs in which children can acquire background knowledge and non-
cognitive skills that predict high achievement. Other social and economic 
improvements could also help—stabilizing and improving low-income families’ 
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failure primarily to the lack of rigorous standards, metrics, and 
accountability. There is significant evidence that persistent 
achievement gaps in U.S. public schooling derive primarily from the 
effects of poverty, segregation, and race and class inequality.45
Nonetheless, market-based reforms funded by wealthy private 
interests and adopted by various governmental actors have 
successfully fostered a narrative that privatization, choice, and other 
market-based approaches will improve public education.  
The Standards effort claims several goals, including: (1) 
strengthening the quality, rigor, and consistency of learning 
standards across states and (2) supporting a market-based, metrics 
and data-driven accountability system across the United States. 
These goals are in tension with one another. They draw support and 
ire from across the political spectrum.46 The efficacy of the Standards 
themselves is contested.47 This Article does not attempt a substantive 
assessment of the Standards. If the Standards set important 
benchmarks and provide an opportunity to provide rigorous and 
equitable preparation of students for college, work, and full 
                                                                                                               
housing opportunities, and ensuring that children can come to school in good 
physical and emotional health, able to be in regular attendance and to concentrate on 
lessons.”).
45. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd, Presidential Address: Education and Poverty: 
Confronting the Evidence, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 203, 203-27 (2012); 
Valerie Strauss, Leave No Unwealthy Child Behind, WASH. POST (May 7, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/05/07/leave-no-
unwealthy-child-behind/ [https://perma.cc/FB9T-G9Q3]; Sean Reardon, No Rich Child 
Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/04/27/no-rich-child-left-behind/?ref=opinion&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SHS3-
MEWP]; SCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at 1-8, 39-40; SALTMAN, supra note 14, at 120; 
Antonia Darder, Schooling and the Empire of Capital: Unleashing the 
Contradictions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 847, 853-54 (2005). 
46. PATRICIA BURCH, HIDDEN MARKETS: THE NEW EDUCATION 
PRIVATIZATION 4-7 (2009). 
47. See, e.g., Brandi M. Haskins, State Discretion over Subject Matter 
Standards: The Rise and Fall of Common Core in Oklahoma, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 441, 454 (2014); see also Saltman, supra note 39, at 677-78 (“The problem 
with the common core standards is not merely . . . that there is no evidence behind 
them. Of course, the standards and the curriculum put forward by the common core 
groups offer little in the way of encouraging students to comprehend how, for 
example, standardization and standardized testing are big business; who, for 
example, is claiming the knowledge in the curriculum and on the future tests to be 
valuable and how they got the social power to enforce it; or what, for example, is 
missing from these canons, such as the voices from below, the perspectives of the 
oppressed, and how the knowledge learned is struggled over by classes and cultural 
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development as engaged democratic participants, they deserve 
support. If, by contrast, the Standards’ implementation is geared 
primarily toward quantification and data collection for purposes 
other than addressing meaningful student preparedness and 
educational equity, then they must be reconsidered. The difficulty 
appears to be that the goals and rationales supporting the Standards 
are mixed. 
One of the difficulties that has emerged in assessing the 
Standards has to do with the current political environment 
surrounding public education policy.48 Efforts to apply market 
models to public education are linked with privatization goals that 
include the notion that public education itself is a market from which 
private investors might profit.49 Defenders of public education as a 
common good that is central to a healthy, equitable, and inclusive 
democracy tend to oppose the market-based version of public 
education and its associated reforms. At the same time, these public 
education advocates seek to improve the quality of the public 
education system as a whole, a goal in tension with reforms based on 
competition and consumer choice. This includes applying resources 
equitably and ensuring quality education with standards that will 
support the growth and development of young people. Specifically, 
these public education advocates seek goals that prepare students to 
be college- and career-ready, fully engaged participants in 
democratic society, and able to achieve their human potential.50  
The Standards project contains elements that people across the 
spectrum—from market-based reformers to those concerned with 
broad, equitable access to high quality public schools—can support 
and oppose.51 As a general matter, the Standards’ requirement for 
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51. Compare Barkan, supra note 38, with Howard Husock, Bill Gates and 
the Common Core: Did He Really Do Anything Wrong?, FORBES (June 18, 2014), 
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depth, inquiry, growth, and consistent benchmarks with flexibility in 
local curricular design, seem to satisfy both camps.52 The emphases 
under the Standards on assessments tied to punitive results for 
students, teachers, and others; the collection of data for a range of 
purposes; and the potential use of the Standards as a mechanism to 
support a mantra of “failure” to justify the system of public common 
schools raise questions among progressives.53 The Standards’ 
national sweep and the involvement of the federal government and a 
small group of elite technocrats raise alarms among conservatives. 
Another difficulty involves the almost unprecedented swiftness 
with which the Standards were developed, adopted, and 
implemented.54 The Standards are often described as resulting from a 
public, state-led process. While this description may be partially true, 
it is well documented that the Standards were developed by business 
leaders in association with several state governors, with significant 
funding support from the Gates Foundation.55 Indeed, the practically 
nationwide adoption of the Standards within less than two years 
provides an example of the way in which private dollars can be 
leveraged to shape core public policy on virtually a national scale.56
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NewYorkCommonCoreTaskForceFinalReport2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW5C-P2CF] 
(noting a 2009 Memorandum of Understanding among the states for a national 
dialogue about the Standards, followed by the 2010 adoption of the Standards in 
New York state as part of the federal Race to the Top application and “an aggressive 
timeline targeting full implementation in the 2012-2013 school year”).
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56. The swiftness with which the Standards were developed and 
implemented may make it appear as if the Gates Foundation waved a multimillion 
dollar magic wand to get the Standards adopted and implemented by a majority of 
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adoption, and implementation of the Standards themselves, it must be noted that the 
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The idea of national standards-based education is part of a 
longer-term trend in public education toward inserting business 
models and metrics into public education policymaking. Most 
observers trace this trend to the publication of A Nation At Risk,57 a
report finding the United States public education system deficient 
according to international comparisons and from the perspective of 
domestic, economic development needs. Accountability measures 
soon took center stage in public education reform discourse, legal 
change, and policy development. This movement used a variety of 
vehicles—public, nonprofit, and corporate entities and partnerships 
contributed to reform efforts over the last two decades. For example, 
at the 1996 National Education Summit, a bipartisan group of 
governors and corporate leaders decided to create and lead an 
organization dedicated to supporting standards-based education 
reform efforts across the states.58
Achieve [is] an independent, bi-partisan, non-profit education reform 
organization. . . . This unique perspective has enabled Achieve to set a 
bold and visionary agenda over the past 15 years, leading Education Week 
in 2006 to rank Achieve as one of the most influential education policy 
organizations in the nation.59  
Thus the public, private, and independent sectors have had a hand in 
seeking to influence education policy for some time. Yet an initiative 
to change core curricular policy nationwide had never been 
proposed, developed, and adopted in such a short span of time and 
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with such a pivotal role played by philanthrocapitalists. The adoption 
of the Standards resulted from a rare confluence of circumstances. 
The Great Recession of 2008 impacted state school budgets across 
the country, causing states to force cuts and seek funding support 
wherever they could find it.60 The federal government stepped in by 
including in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
the RTTT Initiative, which included incentive grants supporting the 
Standards.61 These developments converged with a series of 
education reforms established against a background narrative of 
public school failure, creating a perfect storm for pushing forward 
significant standards-based policy change across the states. 
Philanthro-policymakers formulated and funded much of that 
narrative, along with related policy reforms. 
There are differing accounts of how the Standards came to be 
developed and implemented in a majority of states in a startlingly 
short span of time. These accounts include those that emphasize the 
role of private philanthropy and private enterprise, those that 
emphasize state governors’ roles, and those that emphasize the 
federal government’s role.
1. The Role of Private Philanthropy and Private Enterprise in 
Promoting the Common Core State Standards  
The Common Core story that is the focus of this Article centers 
on the key influence of philanthrocapitalists and philanthro-
policymakers in developing, implementing, and promoting the 
Standards. As Susan Layton wrote in an article that drew national 
attention: 
On a summer day in 2008, Gene Wilhoit, director of a national group of 
state school chiefs, and David Coleman, an emerging evangelist for the 
standards movement, spent hours in Bill Gates’s sleek headquarters near 
Seattle, trying to persuade him and his wife, Melinda, to turn their idea 
into reality.  
Coleman and Wilhoit told the Gateses that academic standards varied so 
wildly between states that high school diplomas had lost all meaning, that 
as many as 40 percent of college freshmen needed remedial classes and 
that U.S. students were falling behind their foreign competitors.62
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Coleman and Wilhoit’s narrative matched the broader narrative 
about public school failure and its threat to global competitiveness 
that was enlisted to support several corporate-based education 
reforms, including charter schools, parent trigger laws, and high-
stakes testing. No mention was made of the fact that U.S. public 
schools in affluent districts were doing very well in global 
competitiveness or of the impact of poverty and inequality on student 
achievement.63 Instead, Coleman and Wilhoit argued “that a 
fragmented education system stifled innovation because textbook 
publishers and software developers were catering to a large number 
of small markets instead of exploring breakthrough products. That 
seemed to resonate with the man who led the creation of the world’s 
dominant computer operating system.”64
Gates was persuaded and provided significant philanthropic 
support to “one of the swiftest and most remarkable shifts in 
education policy in U.S. history.”65 That support extended beyond 
direct funding to develop and write the Standards to include 
advocacy and incentive grants aimed at state governments, certain 
school districts, education advocacy organizations, teachers unions, 
and other key policymakers and their constituents.66 “With more than 
$200 million, the foundation also built political support across the 
country, persuading state governments to make systemic and costly 
changes.”67
The Gates Foundation’s philanthropic contribution was 
significant, but did not stand alone in terms of private support of the 
Standards. In addition to support from other foundations, certain 
private sector corporations were persuaded to use their money and 
influence to back the Standards.68 This effort effectively enlisted state 
and federal government actors and others to move a majority of 
states in the U.S. public education system—a system supported by 
hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer money—to adopt and 
implement curricular standards applied to elementary and high 
school public education. “The result was astounding: Within just two 
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years of the 2008 Seattle meeting, 45 states and the District of 
Columbia had fully adopted the Standards.”69
The Standards effort was far from the Gates Foundation’s first 
foray into public education reform efforts. The Gates Foundation had 
also funded and supported small schools, mayoral control, high-
stakes standardized testing tied to student retention, teacher 
evaluation, school closure and “turnaround,” and charter schools.70
That is to say, the Gates Foundation, along with others in “big 
philanthropy” had been effecting public education reform for several 
years.71 The difference with the Common Core is the degree to which 
it represented more than a pilot or state-by-state effort in 
experimenting with and then seeking to bring market-based reforms 
to scale.72 Rather, Common Core was a policy change that had 
virtually nationwide scope and effected the very heart of public 
education policy—the determination of curricular standards.  
2. National Governors Association and Public–Private 
Partnerships in Developing and Adopting the Common Core 
State Standards 
The Common Core effort also had the support of the National 
Governors Association (NGA), which worked in partnership with 
private entities. With funding support from the Gates Foundation and 
other philanthropists, the National Governors Association in a 
public–private partnership with Achieve, Inc.; the College Board; 
and ACT established the Common Core State Standards Initiative in 
2008. Shortly thereafter, the initiative formed working groups and 
feedback groups to develop the Standards and support their adoption 
and implementation by a majority of states. As noted by the NGA in 
2009:  
Forty-nine states and territories have joined the Common Core State 
Standards Initiative. The initiative is being jointly led by the NGA Center 
and CCSSO in partnership with Achieve, Inc, ACT and the College Board. 
It builds directly on recent efforts of leading organizations and states that 
have focused on developing college-and career-ready standards and 
ensures that these standards can be internationally benchmarked to top-
performing countries around the world. 
. . . .  
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“It is time for us as states to challenge the education system and finally 
answer the question, []What will it take for every child to be successful?” 
stated Gene Wilhoit, executive director of CCSSO. “Fewer, clearer, and 
higher standards will help us get there.”73
Thus, although regularly described as resulting from a public 
process, the Standards were developed, promoted, and readied for 
adoption by a majority of states with the impetus provided by private 
philanthropists and a public–private partnership involving the 
National Governors Association. The federal government further 
catalyzed the adoption of the Standards through a grant initiative.  
3. The Federal Government’s Race to the Top Initiative and 
the Adoption of the Common Core State Standards 
The federal government, under the Obama Administration and 
Education Secretary Arne Duncan, used ARRA74 stimulus dollars to 
help leverage the already significant support that the Gates 
Foundation had given to developing and implementing the 
Standards.75 Included in the stimulus package were several education 
reform measures, most notably the RTTT initiative.76 “The program 
dedicated $4.35 billion for a competitive grant program that would 
be allocated only to states that met specific criteria established by the 
Department of Education to demonstrate that state decision makers 
would follow the direction set by Secretary Duncan.”77 Key among 
the criteria for obtaining an RTTT grant was the inclusion of college- 
and career-ready standards. It soon became clear that the standards 
requirement referred to the Common Core State Standards.  
Secretary Duncan was keen to point out that during the course of the 
competition thirty-five states and the District of Columbia “have adopted 
rigorous common, college- and career-ready standards in reading and 
math, and thirty-four states have changed laws and policies to improve 
education,” suggesting that the new law already had a discernible effect.78  
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Working in conjunction with and building on the policy and 
advocacy spurred by Gates and other philanthro-policymakers, the 
RTTT initiative represented an unprecedented achievement in terms 
of federal influence on public education policy. Some describe this 
as a voluntary collaboration among the states, the federal 
government, and private partners to achieve national standards. 
Others view it as an example of federal overreach into education 
policy, long understood to be the province of the states. 
Whatever one’s view of the relationship or the involvement of 
the state governors and the Federal Education Department, there is 
little question that funding from the Gates Foundation, other 
philanthro-policymakers, and corporate interests catalyzed the 
development and implementation of the Standards. There is also 
little question that the Standards moved from idea to implementation 
at lightning speed.79 The Gates Foundation (and others) did not stop 
with funding to support the development and implementation of the 
Standards.80 Gates also funded a broad range of organizations to 
advocate for the Standards, introduce the Standards to school 
officials at all levels, and enlist the support (or buy the silence) of 
key stakeholders with regard to adopting the Standards.81 The Gates 
Foundation’s philanthropic contributions to the Standards effort was 
estimated at more than $200 million by 2014.82
II. THE EFFECT OF COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS 2010-2015,
THE ROLE OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISTS, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES
The response to the rapid adoption of the Standards was mixed. 
Some viewed the Standards’ adoption as a positive development.83
From an equity perspective, there had long been a view that the 
adoption of consistent, rigorous curricular standards across the States 
could improve both quality and equity in public education84 and also 
help reverse the phenomenon of watered-down standards used to 
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mask unequal educational opportunity in certain states and school 
districts.85 Those holding this view support common standards 
generally. Other advocates support the Standards in particular as a 
means of providing quality, equity, and preparation in public 
education. For example, former Governor Bill Richardson said that 
the Standards should appeal to both Democrats and Republicans 
because they improve rigor, level the playing field, and fuel 
innovation and opportunity.86 Other supporters emphasize that the 
Standards promise to provide clear, consistent baseline expectations 
that will equip students to navigate more complex learning.87
Opponents of the Standards raised procedural, substantive, and 
political objections. Many questioned the rapid adoption of the 
Standards, linking it to lack of study, input, and evidence supporting 
their efficacy. Others expressed concern about the overly formulaic 
and prescriptive nature of the Standards, arguing that they risked 
stifling genuine learning in the name of metrics and testing. Many 
opponents of the Standards were most concerned about their
relationship to standardized testing and the punitive implications for 
students, teachers, and schools. In their view, the Standards and 
testing model served external interests in quantification over interests 
in genuine and effective teaching and learning.88
A. Rapid Implementation of Testing and Lack of Progress Under the 
Common Core State Standards Drew Opposition 
As noted above, states first began developing the Standards in 
2008 and school districts began adopting them as early as 2010. 
Receptivity to and implementation of the Standards varied. Some 
viewed the mixed state, federal, and private collaboration that 
supported rapid adoption of the Standards as a creative approach to 
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governance and policymaking in the face of congressional gridlock 
and wide variations in state education quality.89
Kentucky was one of the earliest states to adopt the Standards, 
with the hope to compete more effectively with the country’s 
“education elite.”90 Kentucky’s adoption of the Standards followed a 
state-based effort to improve standards under the Kentucky 
Education Reform Act, which failed to achieve the desired 
improvements.91 Despite Kentucky’s relative enthusiasm for the 
Standards, implementation has been challenging, causing some 
observers to predict “a slow and potentially frustrating road ahead 
for the other states that are using the Common Core.”92 This is 
because implementation of the Standards is costly and labor 
intensive, with the bulk of costs and labor falling on states and 
localities. Moreover, testing under the Standards, which began 
shortly after their implementation, showed very limited levels of 
student proficiency.93 After three years of implementation, there has 
been some movement toward proficiency, but that movement has 
been sluggish at best.94
In several states, testing under the Standards began before 
schools and teachers had sufficient opportunity to fully implement 
Standards-based curricula.95 Several States experienced significant 
declines in student standardized test scores with the first wave of 
tests administered pursuant to the Standards.96 Many teachers, 
parents, and students were surprised by the rapid introduction, 
implementation, and testing under the Standards. This prompted 
questions in several quarters about how the Standards had been 
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adopted so quickly and with so little public knowledge or 
participation in their development.97 For example, as noted in a 
recent report issued by a New York State Task Force on the 
Common Core: 
The NGA and CCSSO released the final standards for Mathematics and 
English Language Arts & Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science and 
Technical Subjects on June 2, 2010.  
In April 2009, New York State signed a Memorandum of Agreement 
with fifty other states and territories to participate in the national dialogue 
to develop these voluntary standards. Then in 2010, as part of its federal 
Race to the Top application, New York adopted the Common Core 
Learning Standards for English Language Arts (ELA) and Mathematics 
which were phased in with an aggressive timeline targeting full 
implementation in the 2012-2013 school year.  
By the start of the 2012-13 school year, every New York public school 
district was required to have adopted and implemented the Common Core. 
However, SED resources were not fully available at the start of that school 
year, with very few curriculum modules posted on EngageNY.org. This 
timing means that teachers were asked to implement and teach to an 
unavailable curriculum—an impossible task.98
B. Public, Political, and Legal Responses: Challenges to the 
Common Core State Standards 
Following the rollout of the Standards, educators, advocates, 
politicians, and policymakers from across political and ideological 
spectra weighed in.99 Proponents of the Standards hailed their 
relatively rapid and broad adoption by the states as a triumph of 
merit over politics and noted their importance in improving 
education quality.100
Because the Standards had been released very shortly before 
being implemented in a majority of states, there was little 
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understanding of what they were or how they worked.101 There was 
little clarity about the substance of the benchmarks, how they related 
to existing requirements, how the Standards related to curricula, and 
the degree of uniformity and prescriptiveness in the Standards as 
opposed to local flexibility in implementation, among other things.102
There also was concern about the process through which the 
Standards were adopted and the motives behind it. Concerns about 
the Standards drew legal challenges and arguably spurred federal 
legislative action, with the adoption of the Every Student Succeeds 
Act (ESSA). 
1. Public Responses, Concern, Skepticism, and the Opt-Out 
Movement 
Public concern about the Standards intensified significantly 
when several states began testing students under the Standards very 
shortly after adopting them.103 Steep declines in students’ proficiency 
determinations under the Standards’ regime caused many parents and 
students to question both the value and purposes of the Standards.104
Rather than a mechanism to support and improve student learning, 
the Standards seemed designed to punish students, teachers, and 
schools; to aggregate data about students;105 and to reinforce a false 
narrative about wholesale public school failure as a way to foster a 
privatization agenda. Some expressed concern about what they 
perceived as the Gates Foundation’s interest in profiting from deals 
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105. See Elkind, supra note 33, at 56 (citing concerns that the Standards 
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with textbook publishers and testing companies, and from the 
development, population, and future uses of student data systems.106
Reports about the roles of philanthrocapitalists,107 the federal 
government, and governors who sought to establish national 
standards only added to the skepticism and lack of trust about the 
Standards.108 However, the bases for opposition differed somewhat 
among various groups.109 Perhaps the most virulent opposition came 
from parents and teachers who viewed standardized tests under the 
Standards and their connection to teacher evaluation as unfair and an 
attempt to punish teachers and students.110 This opposition led to 
organizing among parents and students to opt-out of taking 
standardized tests under the new Standards.111 The opt-out movement 
began in 2013 and grew by 2015 to the point where the number of 
students opting out of standardized testing began to affect the ability 
of some school districts to assess the efficacy of the Standards.112
These bases for opposition converged in several states, resulting in 
challenges to, and several reversals in, the implementation of the 
Standards.113
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112. Associated Press, Common Core Test Results Start Trickling In, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/common-core-test-results-
start-trickling-in/ [https://perma.cc/C6DZ-9YTE]. 
113. See 50-State Look at How Common Core Playing Out in U.S.,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/02/50-
states-common-core_n_5751864.html [https://perma.cc/53LC-NCSU]. 
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Others were most concerned with the lack of information, 
transparency, and input provided to primary stakeholders—students, 
teachers, parents, and principals, among others. This opposition to 
the Standards centered not only on the content of the Standards 
themselves but also on the process by which they were implemented 
and their connection to high-stakes tests that would determine the 
fates of students, teachers, and schools (and perhaps the entire public 
education system). One process concern included the speed with 
which school districts were testing students under the Standards 
without having had sufficient opportunity to implement and teach 
under the new Standards. Another concern was the degree to which 
standardized testing would drive education decisions. Many 
observers noted a disconnect between what was taught under the new 
Standards and what was tested. Test scores in many states 
plummeted under the Standards. For example, in New York 
approximately 30% of students statewide were deemed proficient in 
reading and math based on test results in 2012 under the newly 
implemented Standards.114
2. Legal Challenges Addressing Federal and Private 
Overreach 
a. Federal Overreach 
Opposition to the Standards and concerns about their 
implementation spurred several states to reverse course. Concern 
about the federal role in promoting adoption of the Standards 
through RTTT grants and waivers of NCLB requirements to in effect 
impose educational policy change on states and localities sparked 
both public outcry and legal challenges.115 Challengers viewed the 
role of the federal RTTT initiative in implementing the Standards as 
an example of federal overreach.116 A previous supporter of the 
Standards initiative—Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana—sued the 
Federal Department of Education on grounds that it had violated the 
                                                     
114. See Corinne Lestch, Ben Chapman & Jennifer Fermino, City Students’ 




115. See, e.g., Black, supra note 4, at 649, 657. 
116. Complaint for Plaintiff at ¶ 21, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-
cv-534, 2015 WL 854132 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 4211009, at *¶ 21. 
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Tenth Amendment by coercing states to adopt the Standards.117 The 
Tenth Amendment provides that any power not explicitly delegated 
to the federal government is reserved for the states. Because the 
Constitution does not confer federal power over education, federal 
statutes addressing education are drawn to respect state power. The 
complaint alleged that the Department’s Race to the Top grant 
through ARRA exceeded federal authority by directing standards, 
assessments, and programs of instruction.118 The district court 
dismissed the case with a finding that the facts did not bear out the 
claim that Louisiana was coerced by the federal government into 
adopting the Standards through its RTTT grant initiative.119 Rather, 
the court found that the state’s adoption of the Standards was 
voluntary.120 Notwithstanding the failure of Jindal’s argument, public 
narratives about federal coercion and overreach persisted. 
Another legal challenge under a theory of federal coercion 
focused on the requirement that states must contract with particular 
members of the Standards consortia.121 These contractors then aid in 
curricular development tied to the Standards’ implementation. In 
September 2014, Missouri residents and taxpayers, filed a petition 
for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging Missouri’s 
membership in and payment of dues to the Smarter Balanced 
Assessment Consortium (SBAC), an educational consortia whose 
purpose was to replace patchwork state standards with uniform 
national educational standards (e.g., the Standards).122 The complaint  
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alleged that Missouri’s membership in SBAC is illegal on three grounds: 
(1) it violates the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 10, 
cl. 3; (2) it violates federal law guaranteeing state and local control of 
curriculum, programs of instruction, and related matters in public schools; 
and (3) it violates Missouri law limiting the number of academic 
performance standards that the state board of education can adopt.123  
Missouri residents and taxpayers challenged Missouri’s membership 
in SBAC and sought to have it enjoined and declared invalid.124
These cases exemplify the significant attention that has been given to 
the federal role in implementing the Standards. Indeed, several 
conservative and Tea Party opponents of the Standards coined the 
term “ObamaCore” to rally opposition to perceived federal 
overreach.125
b. Private and Philanthropic Overreach 
Comparatively less attention has been drawn to concerns about 
overreach by philanthrocapitalists and their corporate allies. This is 
true not only in shaping public education policy to serve their general 
policy preferences in developing “skilled workers,” but also in 
shaping public policy and driving public dollars to enhance private 
profit.126 News reports, books, and policy statements about how 
corporations that have aligned with philanthrocapitalists stand to 
profit from policies only contribute to public skepticism and mistrust 
about the Standards and the role of philanthrocapitalists generally.127
For example, the New York Attorney General determined that the 
                                                                                                               
than the 2014–2015 school year; adhere to the governance of SBAC as outlined in 
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DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 221 (2010) (critiquing 
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Pearson Foundation128 had created Common Core products to 
generate tens of millions of dollars for one of its affiliated corporate 
entities.129 Pearson Foundation developed courses, instructional 
materials, and software offerings aligned with the Standards.130
Pearson sought to win the endorsement of the Gates Foundation and 
to enhance its reputation with policymakers using the Pearson 
Foundation, rather than one of the Pearson for-profit entities.131 The 
projection was that Pearson’s investment in the courses, related 
systems and teaching, professional development, and support 
materials could yield profits in the tens of millions.132 The New York 
Attorney General found that  
[b]y engaging in [such] conduct . . . , the Foundation distributed some of 
its assets and projected income to its sole member, Pearson Inc., in 
violation of N-PCL § 515 and failed properly to administer the charitable 
assets and funds committed to its care as a trustee, in violation of EPTL §§ 
8.1-1 and 8.1-4 and the common law.133
The Pearson incident exemplifies concerns about private 
overreach and profiteering from policies presented as fostering 
public education for the public good. Dissenters fear those policies 
were actually designed to generate profits for private affiliates and 
corporate allies while also shaping public policy to serve broader 
privatization and profit-taking goals. This concern represents the 
dark side of philanthrocapitalists’ cheerful claims about the ability 
“do well by doing good.”134  
The Pearson example also demonstrates a growing concern 
about the use of philanthropy to benefit for-profit corporate 
interests.135 Yet philanthrocapitalists often work hand-in-hand with 
large corporations to achieve aligned policy goals.136 Philanthropic 
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practices supporting for-profit entities and motives raise significant 
questions about the purposes of charitable foundations and their 
treatment under law.137 Some critics cast current foundation practice 
as “plutocratic by nature” and “unaccountable.”138 Defenders of 
philanthropists (including presumably philanthrocapitalists and 
philanthro-policymakers) argue that private parties should be free to 
donate their money as they see fit—that is, without the need for 
public oversight or transparency. Yet the premise behind 
philanthropy is that nonprofit, charitable donations are meant to 
promote the public good. Legal structures providing for tax 
exemption and other favorable treatment draw from this “public 
benefit” premise. Philanthrocapitalism highlights a broader concern 
about philanthropy’s contributions to the public good,139 particularly 
as related to relieving the problems of poverty. Although nonprofit 
charities and foundations exist and receive tax exemption ostensibly 
to serve public and charitable purposes, it has been found that most 
foundation dollars go to wealthy cultural, arts, academic, and 
religious institutions.140 So little foundation money goes to the poor 
that “we need to consider whether tax deductions are warranted at 
all.”141 Perhaps of more concern than seeing foundation dollars go to 
wealthy nonprofit endeavors is the use of philanthropy to benefit for-
profit corporations by pushing public policy change designed to 
provide access and “corner” public markets, like the market for 
public education. As Linsey McGoey observes, “A frequent worry 
among teachers and parents is that Gates money helps position 
private firms such as Pearson and Microsoft to benefit from the 
testing industry that is tightening like a corset around students and 
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teachers.”142 Also of concern is philanthro-policymakers’ practice of 
targeting contributions to disrupt existing public systems to serve 
privately motivated policy goals. Such concerns about the true aims 
behind the Standards initiative contributed to the wave of opposition, 
which led to significant reversals of support for the Standards.143
3. Legislative Response: Passage of the “Every Student 
Succeeds Act” Limits the Federal Role and Reach of the 
Standards 
In part as a response to the myriad concerns raised about the 
implementation of the Standards, Congress, in what was dubbed a 
“Christmas miracle,” passed the “Every Student Succeeds Act” 
(ESSA) on December 10, 2015. ESSA is the long overdue 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), following the broadly recognized failure of the NCLB to 
achieve its stated goals related to improving educational attainment 
and closing achievement gaps among cohorts of U.S. students.144 The 
ESSA significantly constrains the federal role in public education 
policymaking, reducing the power of the Federal Department of 
Education, which had drawn strong opposition in connection with 
the implementation of the Standards. 
III. COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS, PRIVATIZATION,
PHILANTHRO-POLICYMAKING, AND PUBLIC LAW NORMS
As noted above, much attention has been given to the federal–
state process in developing and implementing the Common Core 
State Standards across most of the United States. While some 
attention has focused on the role played by private philanthropists 
and private corporations in fostering the Standards,145 further 
examination of the impact of private and philanthropic influence on 
public education policymaking is needed. Regardless of whether one 
favors or opposes the Standards, the impact of philanthrocapitalists, 
philanthro-policymakers, and other wealthy private interests on the 
public education policy process raises important questions about how 
these investors impact and intersect with public law norms. 
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A key question is how the Standards development process 
squares with public law norms. Can existing understandings of 
public law norms manage appropriately the influence of 
philanthrocapitalists (or philanthro-policymakers) on core public 
education policies? Before exploring these questions, it may be 
helpful to articulate basic public law norms and general 
understandings about how public education policy should be 
developed in the United States, where education is largely viewed as 
central to the viability of democracy and notions of self-
governance.146
Public law is generally understood to involve government and 
the power of the state. In the United States, this power is understood 
to reside in the first instance with “We the People.”147 Government 
power exists to, among other things, “promote the general 
welfare.”148 The United States’ constitutional structure carves out 
roles for the legislature, executive, and judiciary.149 It also establishes 
a relationship between the federal government and the states that 
reserves to the states or to the people “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states.”150
The administrative state—on the federal, state, and local 
levels—has developed over time to implement legislative power 
delegated to the executive through a procedural structure that 
balances public participation and public accountability with agency 
expertise and efficiency.151 Administrative law emphasizes the 
respective influence of the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary in determining the application of key principles and the 
appropriate balance among expertise, efficiency, transparency, 
                                                     
146. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11 (1999) (“A 
democratic theory of education provides principles that, in the face of our social 
disagreements, help us judge (a) who should have authority to make decisions about 
education, and (b) what the moral boundaries of that authority are.”).
147. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Standing in the Shadow of Popular 
Sovereignty, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1869, 1895 (2015) (“[T]he people of each state are a 
part of ‘We the People of the United States’ who, ‘acting as sovereigns of the whole 
country; and in the language of sovereignty, establish[ed] a Constitution.’”).  
148. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
149. See id. arts. I-III.
150. Id. amend. X. 
151. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of 
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 402 (2006). 
Common Core and Philanthrocapitalism 193
deliberation, and public participation.152 In doing so, these 
delegations force the three branches to grapple with various theories 
of democratic governance related to agency action.153
Of course, “public law” covers a lot of law. Its range stretches 
from law and policy issues on tax,154 to nonprofit,155 and even to 
criminal law—all of which are beyond the scope of this Article. The 
focus here is on public law governance, or public government 
policymaking. It encompasses the constitutional structure of 
government and the application of administrative law principles to 
public policy making.156 It highlights tensions that arise when public 
policymaking is instead driven by privatization and the influence of 
wealthy corporate and philanthropic interests. The inquiry also 
centers on a general understanding that the public, private, and civic 
spheres are treated as discrete in law and understood to operate 
differently based on different roles, powers, and limits tied to their 
societal purposes.157
A. Public Law Norms, Governance, Policymaking, and Privatization 
Privatization is one of the most significant recent challenges to 
public law and public institutions.158 A particular concern in the 
current market-focused public education reform era is the impact of 
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privatization159 on public law norms and requirements, as applied to 
public schools as public institutions.160 This shift raises important 
questions about public education, which plays a particularly 
important role in a democratic society that envisions a public sphere 
centered on supporting the common good.161
The introduction and expansion of privatization in the delivery 
of public education raise questions and concerns about the operation 
of public law norms in public education.162 The establishment and 
growth of charter schools; outsourced training of teachers and 
administrators; assessment and evaluation of public school students, 
teachers, and administrators; and the increase in public–private 
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partnerships amplify these concerns. Among others, these public law 
norms include constitutional principles, statutory requirements, 
public oversight, and democratic accountability. This debate raises 
questions about political accountability, often defined as 
“amenability of an action or activity to monitoring and control 
through the political process.”163
Privatization challenges public law norms and complicates the 
treatment of public functions placed in private hands. For example, 
as Gillian Metzger notes,  
A foundational premise of our constitutional order is that public and 
private are distinct spheres, with public agencies and employees being 
subject to constitutional constraints while private entities and individuals 
are not. Private involvement in government is addressed primarily through 
the state action doctrine, which inquires whether, in a particular context, 
ostensibly private parties should be considered “state (or federal) 
actors.”164
And regarding the impact of privatization on constitutional norms, 
Little effort is made to rethink the basic terms of constitutional analysis in 
the face of the disconnect between administrative reality and constitutional 
doctrine. Instead, the focus is on reforming nonconstitutional law to better 
address accountability concerns raised by privatization, specifically the
moral hazard problem: the danger that private actors will exploit their 
position in government programs to advance their own financial or 
partisan interests at the expense of program participants and the public. In 
response, scholars have proposed reforming administrative statutes to 
improve public oversight of privatized programs, imposing greater 
regulation and contractual controls on recipients of government funds, or 
ensuring program participants’ access to private law remedies.165
In response, several scholars have proposed mechanisms for 
retaining public law norms in an environment of increased 
privatization of government functions, like public education.166 This 
has proven difficult, as public law issues related to privatization 
continue to take a back seat to market-based framing of public 
services as public–private hybrids become increasingly dominant in 
changing the shape and understanding of the public sphere.167 The 
                                                     
163. Richard Briffault et al., Public Oversight of Public/Private 
Partnerships, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1358 (2001). 
164. Metzger, supra note 156, at 1369-70.
165. Id. at 1372 (footnotes omitted). 
166. See, e.g., id. at 1374. 
167. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2039 (2005); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000). 
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rise of public–private hybrids has been described as part of a “New 
Governance“ model that blurs regulatory and policymaking 
boundaries along both public and private lines as well as vertical and 
horizontal governmental structures.168
Philanthrocapitalism and philanthro-policymaking add yet 
another dimension to the blurring of governance and policymaking 
boundaries, extending it to the nonprofit sector, which is normally 
treated as distinct from the public and private sectors. Because 
philanthropy involves voluntary donation of private money, 
ostensibly to advance charitable goals or projects meant to serve the 
common good, it is subject neither to public law restrictions nor to 
the more limited contractual boundaries that are found in the context 
of privatization of public services by contract or charter.169 Yet, the 
Standards example, as part of a broader philanthropic effort to 
reform public education, raises concerns about what Linsey McGoey 
dubs “shadow ministries of education.”170 Observing that U.S. 
philanthropic donors spend about $4 billion on education each year, 
McGoey notes that these contributions significantly influence the 
more than $500 billion in public dollars spent on public education 
each year.171
At issue is whether the kind of involvement in public education 
policymaking exemplified by philanthropists’ roles in the rapid 
adoption of the Standards raises public law concerns about public 
policymaking. If so, at what point do such concerns outweigh the 
benefits that flow from philanthropic contributions to public 
                                                     
168. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-
Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 595 (2010) (“The conventional story on regulation involves 
either the formulation of something called ‘law,’ which is more or less fixed, and 
can then be ‘enforced’ by state actors trying to maximize compliance. . . . Or else 
regulation involves the formulation of something called ‘policy,’ which involves the 
balancing of the number of factors to inform the way the state approaches a 
particular issue. Once the policy is formulated, the next stage is ‘implementation.’
. . . New governance blurs the boundaries between law and enforcement, and policy 
and implementation.”). As noted with respect to charter schools: “Over the last two 
decades, charter schools have become further complicated by not only crossing 
public and private boundaries, but merging nonprofit and for-profit organizational 
forms in the provision of education.” Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter 
Schools: The Success of Charter Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board 
Oversight to Preserve Independence and Prevent Domination by For-Profit 
Management Companies, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8 (2011). 
169. See Helge, supra note 154, at 3-4; Brody & Tyler, supra note 157, at 571. 
170. MCGOEY, supra note 13, at 122. 
171. Id.
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education? Further, can public law norms manage 
philanthrocapitalism (or perhaps more aptly philanthro-
policymaking) when it appears to cross a boundary in influencing the 
direction of both public policy and public dollars?  
This inquiry has two parts. First, at what point (if ever) does 
private philanthropy cross a line in directing public dollars and/or 
public policy such that public law norms are threatened? Second, 
assuming that line is crossed, what public law mechanisms can and 
should be used to set boundaries and prevent philanthropic 
overreach? Scholars have considered similar questions in the 
philanthropic172 and broader privatization contexts. They raise 
questions about transparency, public notice, participation, 
engagement in policymaking, and accountability in a sphere where 
there are few oversight requirements that relate to public law norms 
surrounding public policymaking. The increased blurring of lines 
among public, private, and civic (or civil society) spheres presents a 
central challenge to public law norms in the public education context 
and in other sectors. Notably, the ways that public law responds to 
the effects of philanthro-policymaking—where private actors drive 
policymaking and agenda-setting—is more complicated than in the 
context of privatization through contracting.  
The experience with the Standards provides an example of 
philanthrocapitalism that catalyzed massive policy change in public 
education across the country. Whether one favors or opposes the 
Standards, their development and implementation was a significant 
disruption in which private interests were able to shortcut a public 
deliberative process to implement change. The resulting law drew a 
range of public responses, including policy reversals. On a larger 
scale, however, the philanthro-policymaking process presents 
challenges for public policymaking and public administration.  
It is also an example of a process in which private philanthro-
policymakers frame and shape the policy and reform debate in ways 
that have proven difficult for stakeholders and others to reframe. 
Thus, for example, the public education reform discourse in the 
United States over the last several decades has centered on market- 
and metrics-based models, all but ignoring evidence of the impact of 
poverty, inequality, and segregation on public school success.173
                                                     
172. See, e.g., Quam, supra note 10, at 640. 
173. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 44, at 2; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 
43, at 358 (describing wealthy philanthropists as “smothering the democratic 
institution of the community public school . . . inadvertently cheapening American 
education, making it little more than scoring high numbers on tests, a skill that is 
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1. Public Choice? Capture? New Governance? Challenging 
Public Law Norms and Democratic Education Policymaking 
in the Development of Common Core State Standards  
The public law challenge here is multifaceted and difficult to 
define. A small group of philanthrocapitalists and members of the 
business community played a significant—and perhaps outsized—
role in developing and implementing the Standards in forty-five 
states. Nevertheless, the process continues to be described as a 
“public” process.174 Indeed, although it is undisputed that the Gates 
Foundation’s $233 million enabled “writing the new standards 
without a penny from Uncle Sam[,] ‘State-led initiative’ became 
advocates’ mantra for describing Common Core.”175 The actions by 
several important actors created a strong incentive for states to adopt 
the Standards. Specifically, state governors and education-policy 
leaders focused their efforts through Achieve, Inc. Meanwhile, the 
National Governors Association and Federal Department of 
Education developed testing and data collection policies under 
NCLB, as well as the RTTT initiative.176 At the end, these efforts 
combined to create the Standards, but highlighted how the overall 
initiative was at best a nominally “public” process.
The influence of a very small group of wealthy donors and 
contributors in framing, drafting, and promoting the Standards stands 
in stark contrast to general notions of a public, deliberative, 
democratic process.177 The lack of information and input from key 
stakeholders—local school districts, school administrators, teachers, 
parents, and students—raises concerns about the degree to which 
Standards development involved an authentic public process. The 
lack of public understanding, input, and participation in the 
development and implementation of the Standards, and the speed 
                                                                                                               
increasingly separated from genuine learning as focus upon it intensifies”). See 
generally Ladd, supra note 45. 
174. See Elkind, supra note 33, at 53. 
175. Id.; see also MCGOEY, supra note 13, at 137 (noting the Gates 
Foundation spent over $233 million to back the Standards and allocated the money 
to both conservative and progressive interest groups). 
176. See description of the Standards development process, supra note 49
and accompanying text. The Standards were also reviewed by representatives of 
“teachers’ unions, state education officials, academic groups, feedback panels, and 
independent validation committees. Two drafts were published online, generating 
10,000 public comments and prompting further revisions.” Elkind, supra note 33, at 
53.
177. See, e.g., MCGOEY, supra note 13 at 136-38; SALTMAN, supra note 14, at 16. 
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with which they were adopted and implemented, gave many the 
sense that the Standards were imposed rather than deliberated on 
with public participation. For many of those most affected, 
implementation of the Standards came as a surprise and testing under 
the Standards came as a rude awakening (including what has been 
described as an “assessment cliff”).178 Some say that this led to the 
local pushback reflected in various opt-out movements across the 
country.179
a. Public Choice 
Considering the only nominally public processes and 
procedures used to develop, adopt, and implement the Standards,180
they are perceived as lacking democratic legitimacy.181 However, 
some theorists might say that the process of establishing the 
Standards, far from illegitimate, is simply an example of politics and 
public choice theory in action.182 That is, the development of the 
                                                     
178. See, e.g., The Common Core FAQ, NPR ED (May 27, 2014, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/05/27/307755798/the-common-core-faq#q21 
[https://perma.cc/89MQ-VU43] (describing “assessment cliff”); see also Carolyn 
Thompson, NY Standardized Test Scores Drop as Expected, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
7, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/07/new-york-common-core-scores_ 
n_3721360.html [https://perma.cc/K65E-JGTR].  
179. See Valerie Strauss, Why the Movement to Opt out of Common Core 
Tests Is a Big Deal, WASH. POST (May 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/05/03/why-the-movement-to-opt-out-of-common-core-
tests-is-a-big-deal/ [https://perma.cc/CJ8N-A8U9].  
180. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
181. See generally Stan Karp, The Problems with the Common Core,
RETHINKING SCHS., http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/28_02/28_02_karp.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/BUR8-LZCM] (last visited Mar. 16, 2016); Kurzweil, supra note 
5, at 616 (critiquing the use of federal waiver authority in the process of adopting the 
Standards as lacking democratic legitimacy).  
182. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and 
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2002) (“For some 
public choice theorists, government is so suffused with self-interested behavior that 
it is inescapably rotten to the core. Beginning from the premise that human actors 
are self-interested, these scholars reach the conclusion that the only good 
government is less government. Under this view, bad public policy decisions can be 
avoided only by shrinking the quantum of pervertable public power through radical 
deregulation, creating a minimalist night-watchman state. Although this view has 
influential proponents in law and legal scholarship, most scholars who employ 
public choice analysis have a somewhat more optimistic perspective on government. 
They believe that, at least in some circumstances, it is possible to co-opt individually 
opportunistic behavior, so that self-interest-maximizing actors further the collective 
good despite themselves. For these theorists, the goal of those who design 
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Standards resulted from a process based on self-interested actions by 
government and other actors (while articulating nominally public 
goals).183 Others might argue that even under public choice theory, 
the Common Core process should be characterized as simply the 
monopolization of public policymaking in the hands of the most 
wealthy and powerful rent-seekers to the ultimate exclusion of all 
others, contrary to the structure of a participatory democratic 
republic.  
b. Capture 
Still others might characterize the impact of philanthro-
policymaking as a form of capture. “Capture” refers to circumstances 
when private interests, ostensibly regulated by public agencies, 
become so entwined with those agencies that they steer agency 
policymaking to serve private special interests in lieu of the agency’s 
public purposes. In the Standards development and implementation 
process, capture may have occurred through the placement of 
proponents of the Gates Foundation’s position within agencies 
charged with education policymaking. Such claims have been levied, 
for example, against Education Secretary Arne Duncan and in 
connection with New York State’s use of privately compensated 
research fellows to implement state education policy.184
c. New Governance 
There is an argument that might seek to counter concerns about 
capture—or disproportionate influence of the billionaire or business 
constituency in shaping public education policy. This view might 
                                                                                                               
government institutions should be to discover when and how individual self-serving 
desires can be channeled toward public-serving ends. Whenever such channeling 
cannot be accomplished, institutional design should concentrate on curbing the 
damage that self-regarding public and private actors will wreak with government 
power. By thus offering both a descriptive and a normative theory of government, 
public choice responds powerfully to the need to understand why regulatory 
policymaking and execution go wrong.”).
183. See id. See generally Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public 
Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137 (2008); GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY:
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1991). 
184. Michael Winerip, Regents Pay a Political Price for Their Free 
Advisers, Dissenters Warn, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/15/nyregion/free-advisers-cost-ny-education-dept-critics-say.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/GEU8-DYVC]. 
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characterize the process used in adopting the Standards as 
exemplifying a remade public process, perhaps within the very 
general category of “New Governance.”185 According to Douglas 
NeJaime: “New Governance scholars and practitioners have taken 
advantage of the blurred boundary between public and private 
regulation to identify opportunities for more collaborative problem 
solving that empowers stakeholders, including individuals and 
NGOs.”186 He notes how “traditionally state-centered, top-down 
regulatory projects are detaching from a centralized state apparatus 
and devolving from the command-and-control regime of public law 
litigation.”187 NeJaime further observes that “New Governance 
scholarship places primacy on (1) collaborative process, (2) 
stakeholder participation, (3) local experimentation, (4) 
public/private partnership, and (5) flexible policy formation, 
implementation, and monitoring.”188
Some features of New Governance, such as public–private 
collaboration and a problem-solving approach that seek to avoid top-
down bureaucratic pitfalls, were elements of the Standards 
implementation process. The Standards’ process was clearly 
deficient, however, with respect to meaningful, inclusive stakeholder 
participation and local engagement in a deliberative process of policy 
formation. 
Thus, the argument that the Standards’ development and 
implementation operated as a public process under “New 
Governance” is difficult to sustain. Where were the key stakeholders 
in developing Standards for an education system in which poverty, 
segregation, and inequality have been identified as the primary 
drivers of achievement gaps? Indeed, in identifying risks associated 
with “New Governance,” NeJaime notes a central concern that “New 
Governance systems may promise meaningful participation for 
outsider interests but may fail to deliver; instead, New Governance 
regimes might merely confirm the status of outsider groups.”189
                                                     
185. See Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
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Similarly, Archon Fung, an early proponent of New Governance 
approaches in school reform and community policing, acknowledges 
the risks of “domination or capture by powerful factions.”190
Therefore, even if characterized as a form of “New Governance,” 
concerns about capture, exclusion, and the domination of powerful 
private interests remain, demonstrating a need to strengthen public 
law norms in this area. 
B. Reinvigorating Public Norms in Public Education in the Face of 
Extreme Inequality and Segregation 
Administrative law scholars and others have examined the 
challenges to traditional governance posed by the blurring of the 
public and private spheres in public policymaking, particularly as 
related to accountability, transparency, and democratic 
responsiveness. As Mark Vanderbergh observes, 
[P]ublic/private hybrids raise difficult accountability concerns. The 
traditional administrative law means of ensuring agency accountability 
through judicial review of rulemaking and similar measures may do little 
to ensure that public/private hybrids are transparent and responsive to the 
electorate. Importantly, scholars have argued that concerns about the 
accountability of agencies should be redirected to a new search for 
alternative accountability mechanisms that can assure the aggregate 
accountability not only of agencies, but of the new public/private 
hybrids.191
The Standards process, and education reform policymaking 
over the last several years, highlight the accountability, transparency, 
and public participation concerns raised under new public/private 
arrangements in governance and public policy development. These 
challenges are all the greater at a time of increasing income and 
wealth inequality. They become even more complex in the face of 
growing philanthrocapitalism and philanthro-policymaking. Given 
the degree of disruption caused in connection with the development 
of the Standards (and what some view as private policymaking), 
there is a perceived need to reinvigorate public law norms in public 
education policymaking. Questions arise, however, over what 
processes or procedures could be used to address this perceived need 
and whether such prescriptions are warranted. 
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1. Is There a Need To Reinvigorate Public Law? Or Is This 
Simply a New Kind of Public Process? 
The story of the Standards offers two arguments about the 
efficacy of public law norms of democratic accountability, public 
engagement, and civic republicanism in cabining the influence of 
wealthy philanthrocapitalists on public education policymaking. By 
one argument, responses to the Standards demonstrate the 
availability of effective public law boundaries to limit the influence 
of philanthrocapitalists. For example, opposition to the Standards 
included organized responses from the public—such as parents, 
students, teachers, and unions engaged in the opt-out movement or 
other forms of advocacy. Other responses included appeals to the 
courts, administrative enforcement, and perhaps most significantly, 
the federal legislative response in the enactment of the ESSA. 
Indeed, it might be said that, the most contested aspects of the 
Standards’ implementation—including federal overreach and uses of 
standardized tests for teacher evaluation—have been abrogated by 
ESSA.192 These developments could support the view that 
notwithstanding “blurred lines” and public–private collaborations 
under “New Governance“ frameworks, existing public law structures 
provide a sufficient backstop to the most contested policy outcomes 
fostered by wealthy private interests. 
It could be argued, for example, that the Standards resulted 
from a valid public process—perhaps even a more effective “New 
Governance“ process that enabled swift, broad policy change to 
occur by avoiding traditional political barriers that had prevented the 
adoption of common standards in the past. Under this account, the 
opposition to the Standards was simply “politics as usual” catching 
up. It might further be said that even after significant opposition, 
pushback, and reversals, the core of the Standards project remains in 
place. If the ESSA is considered the most robust public response to 
the Standards, it may be argued that despite the Act’s new limitations 
on the federal role in education and the de-linking of teacher 
evaluation from standardized test scores, much of the framework 
supporting the Standards remains intact. The most important 
component is the continued requirement of high-stakes standardized 
tests in virtually every grade.  
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Some might say that this result represents a public process as it 
should be. A policy is proposed and implemented. Particular 
components draw broad opposition. A compromise is reached that 
retains the core of the policy while also responding to the strongest 
objections to it. Public choice theorists might explain the process as 
an example of various constituencies with varying degrees of power 
vying for policy outcomes that best serve their interests.  
If one views the outcome of the ESSA and the Standards’ 
development process overall as a net positive, why should there be 
any concern about the role of philanthrocapitalists? Might it not be 
said that their involvement made the process quicker and more 
efficient? Perhaps. But an important rationale for the existence of 
public law norms is missing from this view—transparency, 
accountability, and meaningful, inclusive stakeholder participation. 
This means that the framing and development of the Standards 
should have involved a public deliberative process rather than a 
private handshake on a summer day.193
2. There Is a Need to Reinvigorate Public Law: Public 
Education Reform Must Involve Procedures Assuring 
Inclusion of Voices and Participation of Those Most 
Affected 
A different view of the Standards process might focus on the 
absence of key stakeholder participation in framing reform or 
shaping the Standards. It might consider the broader project 
supported by philanthrocapitalists and the degree to which key policy 
preferences fostered by wealthy interests remain in place, 
notwithstanding evidence that many such policies do little to benefit 
either key stakeholders (e.g., vulnerable public school students) or 
public education goals, overall. For example, with regard to the 
Standards, the central role of standardized testing aligned to 
narrowly drawn standards remains in place194 as does the project of 
                                                     
193. See Layton, supra note 1. 
194. For example, the ESSA provides that states “engage and support 
teachers in developing and scoring assessments that are part of the innovative 
assessment system, including through the use of high-quality professional 
development, standardized and calibrated scoring rubrics, and other strategies, 
consistent with relevant nationally recognized professional and technical standards, 
to ensure inter-rater reliability and comparability.” ESSA § 1204(e)(2)(B)(v).  
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student data collection.195 Indeed, it may be argued that some of the 
ESSA’s key changes, such as the limits on the federal role in public 
education196 and on the use of tests for teacher evaluation,197 respond 
only to the most powerful and organized opposition to the 
Standards.198 Several matters central to the objectives of 
philanthrocapitalists and philanthro-policymakers remain in place 
and continue as policy under ESSA with little critical examination. 
Thus, the broad project of imposing market-based approaches—
including high-stakes testing, expansion of choice/privatization, and 
student data collection—remains in place in current public education 
policy. This holds, notwithstanding growing evidence that market-
based reforms have not succeeded in improving public education, 
even on their own terms. Consider Kenneth Saltman’s observation:
Corporate school reform has failed on its own dubious terms. It has not 
succeeded in increasing student test scores, reducing costs, reducing 
bureaucracy that impedes efficiencies, or reducing the so-called 
achievement gap. But it has succeeded spectacularly in reframing the 
debates about education in the academic, policy and public realms.199
This goes to concerns about both transparency and 
accountability. Through the Standards implementation process and 
responses to it, little attention was given to the documented 
drawbacks surrounding the high-stakes use of standardized tests. 
Evidence is growing that the manner in which high-stakes tests are 
used under the market-model of education reform is doing little to 
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198. In other words, it might be said that conservatives got what they wanted 
in reducing the federal government’s role in education and that teachers’ unions got 
what they wanted with respect to teacher evaluation. At the same time, key policy 
components related to more fundamental changes in public education policy—like 
the ubiquity of high-stakes standardized tests aligned with market-based 
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199. Saltman, supra note 39, at 675. 
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improve student learning or achievement.200 Yet the heavy use of 
standardized tests remains in place under ESSA. Similarly, questions 
and concerns surrounding student data collection are growing among 
parents, students, privacy advocates, and members of the public, yet 
these questions are not addressed in ESSA or elsewhere. More 
broadly, there remains a lack of transparency about who actually 
develops and decides education policy. Nor is there a plausible 
accountability mechanism for private parties who play a significant 
role in education policy experimentation that may cost the public 
billions of dollars while sending students, teachers, and 
administrators scrambling to keep up with constant change. 
In addition, the involvement of key stakeholders in education 
policymaking remains marginalized.201 This means that input from 
students, parents, teachers, and school administrators most affected 
by public education policy is not part of the policymaking process. 
This contributes to lack of key information about student, teacher, 
and school needs that is essential to effective policy development.  
Philanthrocapitalism, or philanthro-policymaking, is 
problematic because it tends to be opaque, unaccountable, 
exclusionary, and uninformed, while having a significant impact on 
public policy. It also encourages a view aligned with extreme 
privatization that every problem can be solved by applying market-
based principles—even problems created by unchecked markets such 
as an extreme and growing poverty—to the exclusion of those most 
experienced with the problems that need to be solved. “[W]ith its 
emphasis on superrich hyperagents solving social problems, 
philanthrocapitalism” has amplified “the voice of those who already 
wield substantial influence, access, and power.”202 This means, as 
Rieff notes, that  
for the first time in modern history, it has become the conventional 
wisdom that private business—the most politically influential, undertaxed, 
and underregulated sector among those groups that dispose of real power 
                                                     
200. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Darling-Hammond: The Mess We Are in,
WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/ 
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students, and other stakeholders. See generally Tiffani N. Darden, Parental 
Exclusion from the Education Governance Kaleidoscope: Providing a Political 
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and wealth in the world, as well as the least democratically accountable—
should be entrusted with the welfare and fate of the powerless and the 
hungry.203  
Thus a major problem with policy overreach by philanthrocapitalists 
is that it risks perpetuating structures of inequality that are key 
drivers of student-achievement gaps in the name of improving public 
education. 
C. Are There Remedies? Can Philanthrocapitalism in Public 
Education Policymaking Be Managed According to Public Law 
Norms?  
To respond to the concerns about the excessive influence of 
wealthy philanthrocapitalists on public school policymaking, some 
observers have called for (1) increased transparency so that the 
public is made aware of private donations, their purposes,204 and an 
opportunity to respond in a manner that impacts public policy; 
(2) accountability mechanisms to address private overreach in the 
contexts of both privatization and philanthro-policymaking; 
(3) expanding or importing public law norms where privatization and 
private influence on public policymaking threaten public processes; 
and (4) establishing mechanisms to ensure that inherent public 
functions remain within the purview of accountable public actors. 
1. Transparency and Public Participation 
In many ways, proposed responses to philanthrocapitalism’s 
overreach in education policy tend to be similar to proposals to 
manage privatization’s impact on public law norms more broadly. 
Key recommendations for responding to philanthropic overreach into 
public education policy include increased transparency—ensuring 
that the public is timely made aware of the terms and substance of 
private influence on public education policy. Such transparency is 
designed to serve public interests in meaningful understanding, 
engagement, and participation in the policymaking process. For 
example, in the context of private influence in promoting “parent 
trigger legislation,” one proposal is to “require that any paid 
organizers publicly identify themselves and disclose their financial 
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204. See generally Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity 
Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183 (2012). 
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backers.”205 The purpose of such transparency is to ensure that 
privately paid organizers are understood to be agents of private 
interests and aren’t perceived as citizens acting on their own behalf. 
It would give parents and community members a more accurate 
understanding of issues, how they are framed, and the sources of 
their support or opposition. The hope is that such transparency would 
decrease confusion, coercion, and disruption caused by “astroturf” 
organizing funded by private interests to support education reform 
experiments.206
Transparency also would help to encourage public 
participation. Providing key stakeholders and the public with 
information about the sources of support for particular policy 
proposals would improve understanding of motives and rationales, 
and would give interested persons an opportunity to participate more 
effectively in the policymaking process.207 It is important that such 
involvement take place before sweeping policy change is adopted. 
Public input and meaningful deliberation tend to improve the 
policymaking process. In the context of the Standards, such a process 
might have produced less disruption and perhaps yielded better 
outcomes more attuned to the needs of public school students. 
2. Mechanisms to Better Regulate Private Delegations and to 
Support a Public Duty to Supervise 
Administrative law scholars grappling with the need to 
preserve public law norms in an increasingly privatized world have 
proposed means of extending public law norms to set appropriate 
public interest boundaries on private actors performing public 
services. For example, Gillian Metzger proposes treating government 
outsourcing of public services as a form of private delegation.208
Under such a construct, government delegations of authority would 
import public law norms such as due process protections and 
common public oversight mechanisms into privatized government 
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services. The requirements of adequate notice and opportunity to be 
heard prior to significant actions would be imported into government 
outsourcing arrangements. This notion of private delegation seeks to 
elide the “state action” boundary that limits the application of 
procedural due process requirements. Therefore, the basic principles 
of fair notice and opportunity to be heard would travel with the 
government’s delegation of authority over public services to private 
entities.  
Another mechanism for preserving public law norms in the 
privatization context is to maintain a public duty to supervise the 
actions of private entities in the performance of public services. This 
duty would extend beyond the limits of contractual terms to import 
(or preserve) public law norms of oversight and supervision of the 
work of private agents. This idea of a public duty to supervise is 
related to the concept articulated by Paul Verkuil that there exist 
inherent public functions that cannot be delegated to private third 
parties.209 Where such inherent public functions are to be performed, 
they cannot be delegated or outsourced to private third parties. 
The concepts of private delegation, public duty to supervise, 
and excluding inherent public functions from privatization are 
difficult to apply directly to philanthrocapitalism. This is because 
unlike most privatization arrangements, the government is not 
reaching out to the private entity to perform public services under a 
contractual arrangement. Instead, a private entity is voluntarily 
donating significant resources to encourage and support particular 
policy directions or outcomes by government. Often, as noted above, 
the philanthropist applies funding not only to government entities or 
public–private partnerships like Achieve, Inc., but also funds 
advocacy groups and interested organizations as a means of shaping 
the public and political discourse around the policy change. It is 
much more difficult to structure means of importing public law 
norms into such arrangements. Yet, building on the notion of private 
delegation could help public entities to mark a boundary that could 
trigger requirements for increased public notice or more robust 
efforts at public participation. For example, the requirements might 
trigger when private philanthropic donations operate to impact public 
policy in significant and disproportionate ways. Thus, large 
philanthropic donations aimed at catalyzing major policy change 
could be viewed as approaching a private delegation of public 
policymaking, thus requiring additional procedures to notify the 
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public of the policy change and the catalysts for it, and to provide 
greater opportunities for input from key stakeholders and average 
citizens. This concept could be imposed under either a notion of 
private delegation or as an expression of a continued public duty to 
supervise public policymaking, particularly in the face of private 
efforts to exert significant influence.210
3. Oversight of Philanthrocapitalists or Philanthro-
Policymakers—Difficult Yet Imperative 
Were it possible to fit philanthrocapitalists or philanthro-
policymakers into a structure that would require increased 
transparency and public participation, implementing such a 
requirement would be challenging. Just as the Standards were 
adopted according to a nominally public process, it is possible (and 
perhaps likely) that procedures would be put in place that would 
provide for more robust transparency, public participation, 
deliberation, and accountability that similarly would fail to achieve 
the desired public counterweight. 
Another approach might be to regulate philanthropic 
contributions deemed to have a disproportionate impact on public 
policy.211 This might include limits on philanthropic giving or tighter 
regulation where public policy is involved. A problem with such a 
regulatory approach is that it likely would be difficult to structure 
and enforce.212 In addition, as a general matter, generous 
philanthropic support for public projects is generally understood as 
something to be encouraged. Moreover, given the widely varying 
philanthropic approaches and goals, it would be difficult to 
distinguish circumstances that warrant regulation and limits from 
those that do not.  
That seems to leave us with transparency, participation, and 
public accountability as the primary available remedies to 
counterbalance the excessive influence of philanthrocapitalists and 
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philanthro-policymakers on public education. Yet these remedies are 
likely difficult to achieve in an environment of extreme income and 
wealth inequality, where politics is dominated by the influence of a 
small number of extremely wealthy elites.213 This invokes the 
questions whether and to what degree more robust public 
involvement in public education policymaking is possible. These 
kinds of questions tend to divide public law idealists and 
pragmatists214 and highlight the difficulties in achieving the aims of 
democratic education and participatory democracy.215 Despite the 
goal of inclusive deliberative democracy, particularly as related to 
the important project of universal public education, actually 
including and engaging the public, particularly those most 
marginalized, whose interests and lives are most affected by reform 
policies, presents significant challenges.216 As Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin I. Page note: 
Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for 
theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of 
the American public actually have little influence over the policies our 
government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to 
democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and 
association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe 
that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and 
a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a 
democratic society are seriously threatened.217  
Therefore, notwithstanding the difficulties in structuring public 
policy generally, and education policy in particular, to meaningfully 
include the voices, positions, and interests of those most affected yet 
most marginalized, such efforts must be supported and continued. 
This means that at minimum, there should be greater transparency 
about philanthropic contributions impacting public education 
policymaking and a responsibility among public policymakers to 
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expand opportunities for ordinary stakeholders—particularly those 
most marginalized—to be informed about and be heard with respect 
to major policy change. There also should be mechanisms for public 
accountability when private interests exert major influence on public 
policy change.218 These mechanisms include robust enforcement of 
existing limitations on charities vis-à-vis private aggrandizement. In 
addition, because of difficulties regulating those who voluntarily 
give money to foster certain public policies, the emphasis of the 
regulation should operate in tandem with the requirement that public 
actors limit and report significant donations and other methods of 
influence on public policymaking. 
4. Persuading Philanthrocapitalists to Act in Accordance with 
Public Law Norms Designed to Foster the Public Good 
The private, nonprofit, voluntary sector (or independent sector) 
is known for its independence from government regulation. 
Therefore, perhaps in tandem with proposing greater oversight, a 
request should be made directly to key philanthrocapitalists and 
philanthro-policymakers to practice philanthropy differently. The 
experience with the Standards should give the Gates Foundation and 
other philanthrocapitalists pause. The fierce opposition to the 
Standards coming from all across the political spectrum can be 
attributed to the failure to include key voices in the decision-making 
process. This starts with framing the issues and identifying 
meaningful solutions to the perceived failure of public schools to 
prepare all students adequately. For example, rather than focusing 
only on career and college readiness as goals, why not include 
preparing for engaged citizenship, critical thinking, and achievement 
of human potential as equally important policy goals? In addition, in 
identifying causes of opportunity gaps among public school students, 
the vast literature on the impacts that poverty, inequality, and 
segregation have on student learning should be enlisted to shape 
policy responses.  
The risk that proposing such a request to philanthrocapitalists 
like Bill Gates will be perceived as naïve or pointless is not lost on 
me. Nonetheless, I believe that such a request should be made. Just 
as a handful of wealthy philanthropists were persuaded to commit to 
a giving pledge so might they be persuaded to focus their giving in 
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ways that more effectively address structural issues of poverty and 
inequality that impact public school students. A recent article 
describing the Ford Foundation’s approach to philanthropy noted its 
focus on reaching out to the key stakeholders—the people to be 
served—and asking them what they need to solve the problem to be 
addressed.219 Only after hearing and understanding from stakeholders 
what is needed to solve an identified problem is a policy, program, or 
reform implemented. Such an approach keeps the focus on those 
closest to an issue or problem and perhaps may help to remind 
powerful, wealthy funders what is most important in both public 
education policy and philanthropy. As Henry Giroux observes: 
The notion that children should be viewed as a crucial social resource—
one that represents, for any healthy society, important ethical and political 
considerations about the quality of public life, the allocation of social 
provisions and the role of the state as a guardian of public interests—
appears to be lost in a society that refuses to invest in its youth as part of a 
broader commitment to a fully realized democracy. As the social order 
becomes more privatized and militarized, we increasingly face the 
problem of losing a generation of young people to a system of increasing 
intolerance, repression, and moral indifference.220
When one considers what is truly at stake in shaping our 
system of public education, the importance of preserving public law 
norms becomes clear. The public interest must be the central focus of 
public education policy. Public law norms must be used to preserve 
the public, humanitarian goals of public education for the 
development of each student’s full human potential and the 
realization of engaged democratic citizenry.  
CONCLUSION
The well-documented influence of a handful of foundations in 
pushing public education reform (with respect to the Standards and 
beyond) has caused a great deal of disruption, significant public 
expenditure, and the framing of the public education debate in 
market terms. This calls for governance and public policy attention. 
The Common Core State Standards have been touted as an important 
part of the effort to close the achievement gap. Federal involvement 
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in the adoption of the Standards in almost all states has drawn 
significant opposition evidenced in the recently adopted ESSA, 
which reduces the power of the Federal Education Department and 
empowers states with respect to curricular standards and educational 
policymaking. A prominent question is what this means for the 
neediest students. Not only has the framing of public education 
reform by philanthrocapitalists caused great disruption with little 
improvement, it has diverted public policy attention from more 
promising approaches. Absent policies that address the impact of 
poverty, segregation, and discrimination on access to quality 
education, well-funded reforms, whether fostered on the federal, 
state, or local level, will not begin to impact the well-documented 
causes of educational opportunity gaps. These gaps relate to wide 
and increasingly entrenched inequality. Unless and until 
philanthrocapitalists and public policymakers attend to fundamental 
issues of income and wealth inequality, education disparities are 
likely to remain. The question is whether and how the application of 
public law norms can help include those most affected by public 
education policy change. Proposals to increase transparency, public 
oversight, and enforcement and a public duty to supervise and 
engage stakeholders should be adopted and implemented. 
Philanthropists also should be reminded of the impacts of poverty 
and structural inequity on public education and of the importance of 
public institution not a private good. Philanthropic approaches that 
include key stakeholders and seek to address structural inequality 
should be supported. Such proposals should be adopted to help steer 
public education policy in the direction of supporting quality public 
education that will be made available to all children, with an 
emphasis on broad engagement to address structural inequality. 
Otherwise, as Robin Rogers has noted, “Democracy may go the way 
of the concept of privacy, not rejected so much as made obsolete.”221
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